Does formal independence of regulators change? Evidence from Portuguese agencies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Coroado, Susana
• 署名单位: Universidade de Lisboa
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.12413
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: institutional isomorphism; global diffusion; european-union; COMPETITION; capitalism; DELEGATION; POLICY; VARIETIES; set

摘要

The rise of the regulatory state has led to the global diffusion of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). IRAs are the result of the tension between the functional demands of regulatory capitalism and the need of politicians to control policies. Their life cycles have not been linear. Their legal statuses have changed over time, affecting their degrees of independence. This article revisits Gilardi's formal independence index, makes an in-depth diachronic and cross-sectorial analysis of 11 regulatory bodies in Portugal, and searches for explanations for the observed variations. It concludes that the formal independence of IRAs tends to increase due to external pressure and the need of governments to project credible commitment, but principals only grant as much independence as they see fit to satisfy those (external) demands (for change).