Cabinet size and governance in Sub-Saharan Africa

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wehner, Joachim; Mills, Linnea
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University College London
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.12575
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: fiscal-policy; CORRUPTION; ACCOUNTABILITY; determinants; clientelism; DEMOCRACY; PARTIES; WAR; aid

摘要

There is frequent public and media concern over the cost of bloated cabinets in many Sub-Saharan African countries. Scholarship on elite clientelism links cabinet positions with corruption and practices that undermine sound policymaking. This article presents new data on the number of ministers in African governments and documents a robust negative association with several measures of governance, both across countries and in a regression framework that exploits within-country variation over time and accounts for various potential confounders. This suggests policymakers, donors, investors, and citizens should pay close attention to the number of ministers appointed to the cabinet. Although the article cautions against simplistic policy prescriptions, a sizable increase in the number of ministers is likely bad news for governance.