Trustee strategies, politicization and de-delegation: The case of the European Central Bank

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tesche, Tobias
• 署名单位: University of Amsterdam; University of Amsterdam
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.12755
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: police patrols; ECB; legitimacy; DEMOCRACY; COURTS; UNION

摘要

This article shows how the European Central Bank (ECB) reduced the risk of politicization and de facto de-delegation despite experiencing contestation. During the euro area crisis and the coronavirus emergency the ECB's monetary policy measures have been widely praised for their effectiveness. Even though the ECB is an independent trustee that cannot be easily sanctioned, it needs to engage with its principals to receive their political backing for common projects and in order to reaffirm its own centrality in governance. This article identifies different trustee strategies to reduce politicization and thereby to decrease the risk of de facto de-delegation: (i) dualism, (ii) voluntary self-restraint, and (iii) changing the yard stick. It concludes by showing that the ECB has expanded its monetary policy toolbox without triggering neither formal nor de facto de-delegation.