Political and administrative control of expert groups-A mixed-methods study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hesstvedt, Stine; Christensen, Johan
• 署名单位: University of Oslo; Leiden University; Leiden University - Excl LUMC
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.12599
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: bureaucratic politics; european-union; public-policy; commissions; KNOWLEDGE; DELEGATION

摘要

Governments face a fundamental dilemma when asking expert groups for advice. Experts possess knowledge that can help governments design effective and legitimate policies. However, they can also propose different policies than those preferred by government. How do governments solve this conundrum? Through a mixed-methods study, the article examines politico-administrative control with expert advisory commissions in Norway. Arguing that both politicians and bureaucrats can take interest in limiting the gap between political/administrative policy preferences and expert group output, the article examines by what means they seek to control expert groups and how control varies across policy portfolios. It finds that while politicians rely on control by design, bureaucrats use both design and interventions. Moreover, political and bureaucratic controls are stronger in the area of financial/economic policy than elsewhere. The article makes a novel contribution to scholarship at the intersection of public administration and knowledge and policymaking.