Conflict and salience as drivers of corporate lobbying? An elite survey experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aizenberg, Ellis
• 署名单位: Aarhus University
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.12682
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: interest representation; structural dependence; POLICY; state; firm; mobilization; BUSINESS; BIAS; determinants; institutions

摘要

This paper argues that a high degree of conflict and a low degree of salience on a policy issue drives corporations to lobby alone rather than via a business association. Previous research has addressed drivers at organizational, sector and structural level. This paper adds an issue perspective. These arguments are important as democracies thrive when business employs its power in a responsible manner. When corporations lobby alone, it can be a challenge to do so as they tend to overlook long-term interests of the broader business community and society. The arguments are tested for the first time in a corporatist context through an original survey experiment among corporate lobbyists in Germany and the Netherlands. The study finds support for the expectation on conflict, which is striking as it indicates that corporations prefer to lobby alone due to conflict even in contexts in which they are not incentivized to do so.