Why efforts to fight corruption can undermine the social contract: Lessons from a survey experiment in Nigeria

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cheeseman, Nic; Peiffer, Caryn
• 署名单位: University of Birmingham; University of Bristol
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.12720
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: political corruption; developing-countries; tax compliance; perceptions; MODEL

摘要

Anticorruption awareness raising efforts are designed to encourage citizens to resist and report corruption but have been found to either not work or have unwanted effects-including increasing bribe payment. This article represents the first test of whether these efforts also undermine critical aspects of a society's social contract, namely, willingness to pay tax. Using a household level survey experiment in Lagos, Nigeria, we assess whether exposure to five messages about (anti)corruption influence citizens' belief that they have a duty to pay taxes, or tax morale. Though they were different in tone and content, four of the five messages undermined tax morale. We argue that this is likely because anti-corruption messages raise awareness of corruption risks, and hence concerns that taxes will be wasted. In turn, this highlights a new potential unintended and unwanted consequence of policy interventions that focus on raising awareness of government failings.