Street-level bureaucracy and democratic backsliding. Evidence from Poland

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Piotrowska, Barbara Maria
• 署名单位: University of London; King's College London
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.12876
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Populism; agents

摘要

Street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) are central to the implementation of government policies, which becomes crucial in the context of democratic backsliding. Their willingness to carry out policies developed by unprincipled principals influences the final impact of backsliding on citizens. Research on civil servants and anecdotal evidence indicate that SLBs may engage in various dissent activities when they disagree with politicians and their policies. However, the scale of this behavior depends on how many of them perceive the government as unprincipled. Hence, to understand the potential for dissent activities in the face of democratic backsliding, we need to examine SLBs' support for the ruling government. This paper focuses on Poland, an important case of democratic backsliding, analyzing the approval of the opposition parties and the protests in the wake of democracy-undermining reforms among the SLBs. By analyzing Polish Center for Public Opinion Research survey data, it concludes that SLBs' support for the opposition was not overwhelming, rendering significant scale of dissent activities at the street level unlikely.