What's in a Polity? Political Institutions and Varieties of Economic Interventionism in the United States and the European Union

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Di Carlo, Donato; Moretti, Lorenzo; Moschella, Manuela
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; European University Institute; University of Bologna
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.70066
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: joint-decision trap; veto players; FEDERALISM

摘要

This article examines the political foundations of industrial policy amid the return of state economic interventionism. Comparing the United States' Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the European Union's Green Deal Industrial Plan (GDIP), it shows that contrasting industrial policy strategies were ultimately shaped by differences in the two polities' legislative rules. In both cases, geopolitical pressures sparked renewed interest in green industrial policymaking. However, procedural mechanisms for majoritarian decision-making in the U.S. Senate enabled the government to overcome partisan veto players and compelled the design of the IRA as a budgetary instrument centered on fiscal subsidies. By contrast, unanimity requirements in the EU's joint decision-making system prevented the Commission from overcoming Member State veto players in the Council, precluding supranational fiscal instruments and resulting in a regulation-based, decentralized approach via national state aid. The findings contribute to the burgeoning debates on the return of industrial policy and state activism by showing how political institutions contribute to shaping not only the scope but also the form of economic interventionism within different polities.