Legislative Hearings and Presidential Cabinet Management

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lee, Don S.
• 署名单位: Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU); Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
• 刊物名称: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0952-1895
• DOI: 10.1111/gove.70032
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: appointments; POLITICS; DELEGATION; patronage; systems; POLICY

摘要

We examine how legislative hearings, mandatory in the appointment process for top executives, shape presidential management of cabinet. Research on legislative confirmation suggests that such a requirement generates a trade-off in choosing between loyalty and competence types. Building on this insight, we argue that the appointees' career paths after entering presidential cabinets differ significantly after legislative hearings are adopted, according to which type they are. Using a quasi-experimental identification strategy, we analyze original data on the careers of over 560 ministers from South Korea appointed pre- and post-hearings. We find that competence types are more likely to be retained than loyalty types after legislative hearings. However, loyalty types are more likely to receive promotion-that is, transfer from their initial cabinet appointment to a higher-prestige post-than competence types after legislative hearings. Additionally, we find that agency performance is better under competence types than under loyalty types.