Does hiring a new CFO change things? An investigation of changes in discretionary accruals

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Geiger, Marshall A.; North, David S.
• 署名单位: University of Richmond
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 781-809
• 关键词: stock option awards; earnings management; nonaudit services; corporate governance; performance; incentives; Auditors; INFORMATION; QUALITY

摘要

The recent spate of fraudulent financial reporting in the U.S. has drawn attention to the fact that the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) has a substantial amount of control over a firm's reported financial results. This paper examines the changes in discretionary accruals surrounding the appointment of a new CFO. Using a sample of 712 companies that appointed a new CFO in the period 1994 to 2000, we find that discretionary accruals decreased significantly following the appointment of a new CFO. Our tests indicate that this reduction is significantly greater for our group of CFO-hiring firms than for a control group of non-hiring firms, and that the changes are not driven by a concurrent appointment of a new Chief Executive Officer (CEO). We also find that our results are largely driven by firms that hire a new CFO from outside the company. Our study extends earlier research by providing empirical evidence that individuals in CFO positions wield significant influence over the firm's reported financial results and that a firm's discretionary accruals are significantly reduced surrounding the appointment of a new CFO.