Uniformity versus flexibility: Evidence from pricing of the pension obligation

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Hann, Rebecca N.; Lu, Yvonne Y.; Subramanyam, K. R.
署名单位:
University of Southern California
刊物名称:
ACCOUNTING REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN:
0001-4826
DOI:
10.2308/accr.2007.82.1.107
发表日期:
2007
页码:
107-137
关键词:
VALUE-RELEVANCE INFORMATION management DISCRETION
摘要:
We functionally derive the discretionary component of the pension obligation (PBO) based on deviation of actuarial assumptions-discount rate and compensation growth rate-from their respective industry medians. We then examine the implications of allowing discretion in the choice of pension assumptions on the pricing of the PBO. We find no evidence that discretion-as currently allowed under U.S. GAAP-impairs the value relevance of the PBO. We also find that the discretionary component is incrementally value-relevant beyond the nondiscretionary component. Additional analyses suggest that these results are unlikely attributable to market fixation on reported PBO or measurement error in our discretionary component. Overall, we find that imposing uniformity in the choice of pension assumptions, on average, prevents communication of value-relevant information through the PBO.