Promotions, Turnover, and Performance Evaluation: Evidence from the Careers of Division Managers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cichello, Michael S.; Fee, C. Edward; Hadlock, Charles J.; Sonti, Ramana
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Michigan State University; Indian School of Business (ISB)
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/accr.2009.84.4.1119
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 1119-1143
• 关键词: INTERACTION TERMS; moral hazard; COMPENSATION; incentives; MARKET; INFORMATION; IMPACT; logit; RISK; firm

摘要

We study turnover and promotions of division managers in multidivisional firms. Turnover is negatively related to divisional accounting performance, positively related to industry performance, but not significantly related to firm performance or the performance of other divisions. Consistent with tournament theory, promotions are significantly related to whether one division is performing better than others, but are not significantly related to the magnitude of any performance difference. A simple performance metric, divisional ROA, appears more closely related to job allocation decisions than several alternatives. Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that accounting information is used by firms when evaluating managerial personnel.