Discretionary Revenues as a Measure of Earnings Management

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Stubben, Stephen R.
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/accr.2010.85.2.695
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 695-717
• 关键词: accruals; manipulation; incentives; QUALITY

摘要

This study examines the ability of revenue and accrual models to detect simulated and actual earnings management. The results indicate that revenue models are less biased, better specified, and more powerful than commonly used accrual models. Using a simulation procedure, I find that revenue models are more likely than accrual models to detect a combination of revenue and expense manipulation. Using a sample of firms subject to SEC enforcement actions for a mix of revenue- and expense-related misstatements, I find that, although revenue models detect manipulation, accrual models do not. These findings provide support for using measures of discretionary revenues to study earnings management.