The Determinants and Performance Effects of Managers' Performance Evaluation Biases

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bol, Jasmijn C.
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/accr-10099
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1549-1575
• 关键词: ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE; implicit contracts; social cognition; appraisal; INFORMATION; ACCOUNTABILITY; incentives; principal; ratings; context

摘要

This study examines the determinants and performance effects of centrality bias and leniency bias. The results show that managers respond to their own incentives and preferences when subjectively evaluating performance. Specifically, information-gathering costs and strong employee-manager relationships positively affect centrality bias and leniency bias. The findings also indicate that performance evaluation biases affect not only current performance ratings, but also future employee incentives. Inconsistent with predictions based on the agency perspective, the results show that managers' performance evaluation biases are not necessarily detrimental to compensation contracting. Although centrality bias negatively affects performance improvement, the evidence does not reveal a significant negative relation between leniency bias and performance. Rather, leniency bias is positively associated with future performance, which is consistent with the behavioral argument that bias can improve perceived fairness and, in turn, employee motivation.