Affiliated Banker on Board and Conservative Accounting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Erkens, David H.; Subramanyam, K. R.; Zhang, Jieying
• 署名单位: University of Southern California; Indian School of Business (ISB); University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/accr-50798
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1703-1728
• 关键词: CONFLICTS-OF-INTEREST; lending relationships; COSTS; OWNERSHIP; benefits; RENEGOTIATION; Timeliness; bankruptcy; EFFICIENCY; CONTRACTS

摘要

We examine the effect of lender monitoring through board representation, which we label affiliated banker on board (AFB) on conservative accounting. We hypothesize that monitoring reduces lenders' demand for conservatism-facilitated control transfers through debt covenants by reducing the information asymmetry that underlies the agency problem of debt. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that AFB firms have markedly lower conservative accounting than non-AFB firms. This result is robust to a battery of tests that account for bias from both observable and unobservable factors. We also find additional evidence to support key elements of our hypothesis. First, an examination of the relation between borrower-unfavorable renegotiations and covenant violations suggests that board representation allows lenders to renegotiate in a timelier manner based on private information. Second, an examination of the relation between covenant intensity and conservative accounting suggests that board representation decreases lenders' reliance on conservatism-facilitated control transfers. Finally, an analysis that uses relationship lending as an alternative proxy of lender monitoring suggests that it is lender monitoring, and not AFB per se, that reduces demand for conservative accounting.