Non-Executive Employee Ownership and Corporate Risk

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bova, Francesco; Kolev, Kalin; Thomas, Jacob K.; Zhang, X. Frank
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; Yale University
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/accr-50860
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 115-145
• 关键词: STOCK OPTION PLANS; EMPIRICAL-EXAMINATION; HEDGING POLICIES; Firm investment; COMPENSATION; incentives; industry; equity; determinants; governance

摘要

Prior research documents a negative link between risk and executive holding of stock, but a corresponding positive link for options. We find a similar negative relation for non-executive holding of stock. Our finding is consistent with the view that non-executives not only face significant incentives to reduce risk when they hold stock, but they are also able to affect corporate risk. While endogeneity cannot be ruled out fully, the results of a battery of tests suggest that it plays a limited role. A second robust result is that the documented relation becomes more negative as option-based executive compensation increases. Overall, corporate risk is related to the incentives created by stock and options held by both executives and non-executives, as well as interactions among those incentives.