On the Stewardship Value of Soft Managerial Reports

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sabac, Florin; Tian, Jie (Joyce)
• 署名单位: University of Alberta; University of Waterloo
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/accr-50946
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1683-1706
• 关键词: voluntary disclosure; decision information; financial reports; performance; COMMUNICATION; asymmetry; agencies; DESIGN

摘要

We characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for communication of private, unverifiable managerial information to be valuable for stewardship purposes. First, the hard, verifiable information must be able to confirm to some extent the truthfulness of the manager's soft, unverifiable report. Second, neither the hard, verifiable information nor the soft, unverifiable managerial report should be too informative for providing effort incentives because that makes it harder to motivate truthful reports from the manager. In particular, this conflict can be sufficiently severe that eliciting reports from the manager has no value.