Did the 1999 NYSE and NASDAQ Listing Standard Changes on Audit Committee Composition Benefit Investors?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kim, Seil; Klein, April
• 署名单位: City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); New York University; University of Warwick
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/accr-51716
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 187-212
• 关键词: sarbanes-oxley act; accrual estimation errors; earnings management; corporate governance; QUALITY; BOARD; DIRECTORS; expertise; INDEPENDENCE; CONSEQUENCES

摘要

In December 1999, the SEC instituted a new listing standard for NYSE and NASDAQ firms. Listed firms were now required to maintain fully independent audit committees with at least three members. In July 2002, the U.S. Congress legislated these standards through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Our research question is whether all investors benefited from the 1999 new rule. Using both an event study and a difference-in-differences methodology, we find no evidence of higher market value or better financial reporting quality resulting from this rule.