Strategic Disclosures of Litigation Loss Contingencies When Customer-Supplier Relationships Are at Risk

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cen, Ling; Chen, Feng; Hou, Yu; Richardson, Gordon D.
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; Chinese University of Hong Kong; Queens University - Canada
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/accr-51869
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 137-159
• 关键词: corporate suppliers; repeated games; INFORMATION; chain; determinants; essays

摘要

In the presence of litigation-facing suppliers, the supply chain relationship is at risk. Suppliers with principal customers (dependent suppliers) have a higher concentration of sales to customers, and they are more at risk relative to suppliers without principal customers (non-dependent suppliers). As a result, we predict and find that litigation disclosure patterns differ for the two supplier types: dependent suppliers are more likely to delay bad news and accelerate good news related to litigation outcomes, compared to non-dependent suppliers. Such strategic disclosure patterns in our end-game setting are opposite to those documented in the existing supply chain literature for the repeated-game setting (for example, Hui, Klasa, and Yeung 2012).