Taxation and Corporate Risk-Taking

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Langenmayr, Dominika; Lester, Rebecca
• 署名单位: Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/accr-51872
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 237-266
• 关键词: tax-law asymmetries; Firm risk; capital structure; income taxation; moral hazard; panel-data; INVESTMENT; US; incentives; management

摘要

We study whether the corporate tax system provides incentives for risky firm investment. We analytically and empirically show two main findings: first, risk-taking is positively related to the length of tax loss periods because the loss rules shift some risk to the government; and second, the tax rate has a positive effect on risk-taking for firms that expect to use losses, and a weak negative effect for those that cannot. Thus, the sign of the tax effect on risky investment hinges on firm-specific expectations of future loss recovery.