Analysts' Influence on Managers' Guidance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chapman, Kimball; Green, Jeremiah R.
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL); Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/accr-51778
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 45-69
• 关键词: CONFERENCE CALLS; earnings guidance; voluntary disclosures; investor relations; forecasts; cost; INFORMATION; BEHAVIOR; firm; CONSEQUENCES

摘要

Analysts ask managers for forward-looking information in one-third of quarterly conference calls; most frequently, seeking earnings per share guidance. In this study, we examine the long-term consequences of analysts' questions on future manager disclosure choices. Using six types of commonly provided guidance, we find that when analysts request new guidance or ask about prior guidance, managers are more likely to provide similar guidance in future quarters. When analysts do not ask about prior guidance, managers are less likely to provide that type of guidance in the future. This effect is long-lasting, spills over into earnings announcements, and is strongest for firms with the most severe information problems. Our results provide evidence that analysts shape managers' disclosure choices in meaningful ways.