Auditor Actions and the Deterrence of Manager Opportunism: The Importance of Communication to the Board and Consistency with Peer Behavior

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Buchanan, Jessica L.; Commerford, Benjamin P.; Wang, Elaine (Ying)
• 署名单位: Providence College; University of Kentucky; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/TAR-2017-0035
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 141-163
• 关键词: real earnings management; activities manipulation; corporate governance; certainty; sensitivity; decisions; severity; NORMS; MODEL; FIRMS

摘要

Informed by Perceptual Deterrence Theory, we conduct multiple experiments to investigate when and how auditor actions can help deter manager opportunism. In Study 1A, we find that managers are less likely to use real earnings management (REM) when they expect auditors to both increase scrutiny and communicate their observations to the board. However, this effect occurs only when managers' operational decisions are inconsistent (versus consistent) with peer behavior. Study 1B findings suggest that increased auditor scrutiny alone (without auditor-board communication) is not likely to deter REM. In Study 2, we find that increased auditor scrutiny with communication to the board effectively deters both accruals-based earnings management (AEM) and REM, reducing the total level of manager opportunism. However, without communication, increased auditor scrutiny deters AEM, but also induces more REM. Our findings highlight the importance of auditor-board communication and demonstrate how auditor actions can contribute to the deterrence of manager opportunism.