Do Reporting Incentives and Consequences Change under the New Lease Accounting Standard?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Christensen, Derek M.; Linsmeier, Thomas J.; Wangerin, Daniel D.
• 署名单位: University of Oregon; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/TAR-2022-0266
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 159-185
• 关键词: operating leases; VALUE-RELEVANCE; Credit ratings; disclosure; debt; RECOGNITION; determinants; INFORMATION; default; COSTS

摘要

This research evaluates whether reporting incentives and consequences change under the new lease accounting standard. Under prior guidance (SFAS 13), we predict and find firms with high financing cost sensitivities to leverage have greater incentive to finance investments with operating leases. Under the new lease accounting standard (ASU 2016-02), we predict and find this leverage incentive remains but is reduced, consistent with the FASB's objective to limit opportunities to structure lease contracts for balance sheet purposes. Under ASU 2016-02, we also predict and find that the leverage incentive encourages firms to reduce operating lease liabilities by decreasing the duration of minimum lease payments. Lastly, we predict and find that firms use fewer operating leases under both SFAS 13 and ASU 2016-02 when managers' income objectives exclude depreciation and/or interest expense. These findings suggest reporting incentives remain post ASU 2016-02 that encourage firms to structure leases to achieve accounting outcomes.