Disclosure to Regulate Learning in Product Markets from the Stock Market
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Arya, Anil; Ramanan, Ram N., V
署名单位：
University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Binghamton University, SUNY
刊物名称：
ACCOUNTING REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0001-4826
DOI：
10.2308/TAR-2020-0033
发表日期：
2022
页码：
1-24
关键词：
摘要：
A firm???s stock price may reveal information to a variety of participants, including its strategic partners and competitive rivals. This paper establishes that when a firm discloses cost information it can confound decision relevant demand information embedded in the stock price that observers can otherwise extract. With stock price valuing firm profit (not cost and revenue separately), a disconnect is introduced between the firm???s actions and its intent???it discloses more (less) on one dimension when its intent is to conceal (reveal) on another. Moreover, the firm???s intent can be to either reveal or conceal information depending on what gives its partner the best competitive edge over its rival. Consequently, a firm???s disclosure is made strategically, incorporating both valuation and competitive effects. Interestingly, the firm???s disclosure strategy is designed in close concert with its production decision, i.e., the firm???s optimal accounting and real decisions interact with each other for maximum impact.