The Deterrent Effect of Insider Trading Enforcement Actions
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Davidson, Robert H.; Pirinsky, Christo
署名单位：
Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; State University System of Florida; University of Central Florida
刊物名称：
ACCOUNTING REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0001-4826
DOI：
10.2308/TAR-2020-0003
发表日期：
2022
页码：
227-247
关键词：
摘要：
We analyze whether exposure to an SEC insider trading enforcement action affects how insiders trade. We find that following an insider trading enforcement action at one firm, exposed insiders earn significantly lower abnormal profits from their trades at other firms compared to non-exposed insiders. The deterrent effect is stronger when a fellow insider is convicted, and is similarly significant both pre- and post-SOX. Following the enforcement event, exposed insiders do not trade less frequently, but do trade significantly fewer shares per trade. Insiders who have witnessed an enforcement action have a lower probability for future conviction than their unexposed peers.
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