Do Managers Learn from Analysts about Investing? Evidence from Internal Capital Allocation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guo, Re-Jin; Zhong, Rong (Irene)
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/TAR-2020-0088
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 215-246
• 关键词: ASYMMETRIC-INFORMATION; CORPORATE DISCLOSURE; side; INVESTMENT; coverage; MARKETS; COMPETITION; incentives; accuracy

摘要

Analysts are recognized for their expertise in predicting industry growth, yet little is known about whether CEOs learn from analysts' insights to guide investment decisions. Focusing on conglomerates where CEOs are underinformed about segment growth opportunities, we find that CEOs learn industry insights from analysts to adjust internal capital allocation. The extent of learning increases when analysts have closer proximity to CEOs or expertise in segments where CEOs face larger internal knowledge gaps. CEOs likely learn from analysts through private communications, as the insights learned are not yet publicly available, difficult to replace with other sources, and persistently impactful for firms. CEOs also exploit conference calls as another way to learn from analysts. As a result, learning analysts' insights enhances firm value. We employ brokerage mergers/closures as a quasi -experiment to address endogeneity concerns. Overall, our study provides novel evidence on a learning channel through which analysts add value to firms.