More Disclosure, Fewer Outside Opportunities? Accelerated Patent Disclosure and Market for Managerial Human Capital

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wu, Fan
• 署名单位: Chinese University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/TAR-2024-0582
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 405-438
• 关键词: BOARD INTERLOCKS; KNOWLEDGE; DIRECTORS; INNOVATION; expertise; TIES; COMPENSATION; capabilities; dependence; companies

摘要

This paper studies whether and how firms' enhanced public disclosures of patent filings can spill over to the managerial labor market. Consistent with these disclosures crowding out the demand for directors and senior managers' (DSMs) private information, I find that their external employment opportunities deteriorate when firms disclose patent information more timely. This effect is more pronounced when the strategic value of the disclosed information is higher and when DSMs face fewer barriers to sharing information. Additionally, the decline in their human capital value is reflected in a diminished role in transferring timely information about technological innovations. Collectively, these results shed light on how public disclosures can shape the managerial labor market by substituting private information flows between firms through DSM ties.