Voluntary Disclosure Quality and Analyst Coverage

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Warren, James D.
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/TAR-2021-0137
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: institutional investors; information asymmetry; CORPORATE DISCLOSURE; Managers; LITIGATION; forecasts; matter; FIRMS; cost; CONSEQUENCES

摘要

Prior work documents that managers increase the quantity of earnings guidance provided after exogenously losing coverage from an equity analyst. I examine how analysts influence guidance quality. I find that following an exogenous reduction in analyst coverage, managers issue earnings guidance that is lower quality (i.e., it is less accurate). This result varies predictably based on managers' incentives, features of the firm's analyst coverage, and the presence of other intermediaries. Overall, my findings identify a situation in which guidance quantity and quality move in divergent directions and highlight that analysts can be an important determinant of voluntary disclosure quality.