Biased voluntary disclosure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Einhorn, Eti; Ziv, Amir
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1380-6653
• DOI: 10.1007/s11142-011-9177-0
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 420-442
• 关键词: earnings management; information endowment; Strategic stability; signaling games; equilibrium; FIRMS; uncertainty; MARKETS; essays; MODEL

摘要

We provide a bridge between the voluntary disclosure and the earnings management literature. Voluntary disclosure models focus on managers' discretion in deciding whether or not to provide truthful voluntary disclosure to the capital market. Earnings management models, on the other hand, concentrate on managers' discretion in deciding how to bias their mandatory disclosure. By analyzing managers' disclosure strategy when disclosure is voluntary and not necessarily truthful, we show the robustness of voluntary disclosure theory to the relaxation of the standard assumption of truthful reporting. We also demonstrate the sensitivity of earnings management theory to the commonly made mandatory disclosure assumption.