Discussion of Board interlocks and the diffusion of disclosure policy
成果类型：
Editorial Material
署名作者：
Zhang, Weining
刊物名称：
REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES
ISSN/ISSBN：
1380-6653
DOI：
10.1007/s11142-014-9290-y
发表日期：
2014
页码：
1120-1124
关键词：
摘要：
Cai et al. (Rev Account Stud, forthcoming, 2014) find that firms with interlocked directors are more likely to stop quarterly forecasts and that the past stopping experience of interlocked directors affects the forecast-cessation process. Their findings are consistent with the notion that interlocked directors serve as conduits for information sharing, which may result in the change of corporate disclosure policies. My discussion focuses on potential issues with the findings and implications for future study.
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