Discussion of equilibrium earnings management and managerial compensation in a multiperiod agency setting

• 成果类型: Editorial Material
• 署名作者: Marinovic, Ivan
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1380-6653
• DOI: 10.1007/s11142-014-9287-6
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1078-1085
• 关键词: incentive contracts; ceo incentives; MODEL

摘要

Dutta and Fan (Rev Account Stud, 2014), this issue, study the implications of earnings management on managerial compensation, in a two-period LEN setting. They analyze the level as well as the evolution of compensation. Furthermore, they consider the possibility of joint moral hazard and adverse selection problems. I discuss the empirical implications of their analysis, in the context of a slightly more general dynamic setting, and examine the robustness of some of their results with respect to the assumption that the principal can enforce claw-backs.