CEO incentives and the health of defined benefit pension plans

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Begley, Joy; Chamberlain, Sandra; Yang, Shuo; Zhang, Jenny Li
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia; Hong Kong Polytechnic University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1380-6653
• DOI: 10.1007/s11142-015-9332-0
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1013-1058
• 关键词: debt; constraints; INVESTMENT; holdings

摘要

We examine the relation between CEO pay-related wealth and the funding levels, and freezing decisions, of defined benefit pension plans. Results show that higher funding levels occur when CEOs are most endowed in employee pension plans, but that spillover endowments in supplemental executive plans coincide with the lowest funding levels. CEO equity-wealth correlates with funding health in between the extremes. Further, hard freezes of employee plans are less likely, the larger the CEO's total pension interest (in executive and employee plans together). This suggests that CEOs fear repercussions to their own pension plan when employee plans are frozen.