Forward contracting and incentives for disclosure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Arya, Anil; Mittendorf, Brian; Sudbury, Austin
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1380-6653
• DOI: 10.1007/s11142-015-9328-9
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1093-1121
• 关键词: Supply chain; Vertical contracts; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; oligopoly; equilibrium; electricity; management; bertrand; MARKETS

摘要

As stressed in the literature, disclosure often has different ramifications for firms' varied constituents. Despite this complexity, a consistent theme in the literature is that a firm's reliance on a self-interested external supplier for key inputs introduces a disincentive for disclosure. We demonstrate that the presence of forward contracting in such input markets can disable, and even reverse, this well-established theme. When a supplier opts to provide inputs for pre-purchase in a forward market, a buyer can use such pre-purchases to protect against the supplier adjusting input prices upward when disclosure reveals high product demand. This price protection does not imply that the supplier stands to lose under the arrangement-its ability to offer two-tiered pricing (forward and spot prices) provides it with a means of indirect price discrimination. Because of the supplier's willingness to open a forward market, the firm's reliance on the supplier for inputs actually promotes disclosure.