Speaking of the short-term: disclosure horizon and managerial myopia

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brochet, Francois; Loumioti, Maria; Serafeim, George
• 署名单位: Boston University; University of Southern California; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1380-6653
• DOI: 10.1007/s11142-015-9329-8
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1122-1163
• 关键词: MANAGEMENT EARNINGS FORECASTS; institutional investors; CONFERENCE CALLS; executive-compensation; incentives; FIRMS; performance; INVESTMENT; guidance; BEHAVIOR

摘要

We study conference calls as a voluntary disclosure channel and create a proxy for the time horizon that senior executives emphasize in their communications. We find that our measure of disclosure time horizon is associated with capital market pressures and executives' short-term monetary incentives. Consistent with the language emphasized during conference calls partially capturing short-termism, we show that our proxy is associated with earnings and real activities management. Overall, the results show that the time horizon of conference call narratives can be informative about managers' myopic behavior.