Leading indicator variables and managerial incentives in a dynamic agency setting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fan, Qintao; Li, Wei
• 署名单位: University of Oregon; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1380-6653
• DOI: 10.1007/s11142-018-9461-3
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1715-1753
• 关键词: nonfinancial performance-measures; ceo compensation; moral hazard; RENEGOTIATION; management; CONTRACTS; aggregation; INFORMATION; CHOICE

摘要

This paper studies, in a dynamic agency setting, how incentives and contractual efficiency are affected by leading indicators of firms' future financial performance. In our two-period model, a leading indicator variable provides a noisy forecast of the uncertain return from the manager's long-term effort, and both contracting parties cannot refrain from renegotiating contract terms based on updated information. We find that the leading indicator can reduce the manager's long-term effort incentive, as it allows the firm owner to capture more of the resulting return through renegotiated wages (i.e., the manager is held up). By reducing the uncertainty about future aggregate cash flows, the leading indicator also exacerbates the ratchet effect and discourages the manager's short-term effort. In equilibrium, as the leading indicator becomes more accurate in forecasting future cash flows, the first-period contract attaches higher explicit weights to both the forward-looking leading indicator and backward-looking cash flow, and yet the manager may find it optimal to reduce both the short- and long-term efforts. We further show that with a more accurate leading indicator variable, the explicit incentive on the lagging cash flow may increase more than that on the leading indicator, and the equilibrium firm profit may decrease and diverge from the manager's equilibrium efforts.