Nonprofit executive incentive pay

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Balsam, Steven; Harris, Erica E.
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; Villanova University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1380-6653
• DOI: 10.1007/s11142-018-9473-z
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1665-1714
• 关键词: for-profit; ceo compensation; Managerial compensation; performance; governance; ORGANIZATIONS; determinants; Donations; QUALITY; IMPACT

摘要

We utilize information only recently disclosed on Form 990 to examine the use, and consequences of, incentive pay at nonprofit organizations. Bonuses are common in nonprofits, as we observe that approximately 45% of the 44,000 organization-year observations in our sample reported paying CEO bonuses. We find that the bonuses are positively associated with profitability, competition from other nonprofits, firm size, available cash, and use of compensation consultants and committees, while negatively related to board oversight, donations, and grants. Our results also suggest that donors look unfavorably at the payment of bonuses; that is, bonuses are associated with lower future donations. Nonetheless, we find evidence consistent with the payment of bonuses incentivizing nonprofit executives, as despite reduced fundraising, future profitability and program services are positively associated with current bonus compensation.