Improving the measures of real earnings management

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Srivastava, Anup
• 署名单位: University of Calgary
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1380-6653
• DOI: 10.1007/s11142-019-09505-z
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1277-1316
• 关键词: debt covenant violation; activities manipulation; LIFE; INFORMATION; accruals; QUALITY; FIRMS; investors; IMPACT; income

摘要

Firms often change their operating policy to meet a short-term financial reporting target. Accounting researchers call this opportunistic action real earnings management (REM). They measure REM by the difference between a firm's costs and those reported by its industry peers. Firms that pursue distinct competitive strategies also display different cost patterns than peers. However, the models that measure REM do not control for differences in competitive strategy. Hence a researcher can misinterpret a cost difference that stems from a firm's competitive strategy as REM. The researcher would also find a spurious correlation between earnings management and a firm characteristic that varies with competitive strategy. A cause or effect relationship with earnings management could be wrongfully inferred. I suggest improvements in measurement models to avoid misspecification.