Voluntary versus mandatory disclosure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bertomeu, Jeremy; Vaysman, Igor; Xue, Wenjie
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL); City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1380-6653
• DOI: 10.1007/s11142-020-09579-0
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 658-692
• 关键词: economic consequences; good-news; INFORMATION; QUALITY; MARKET; conservatism; CHOICE

摘要

We develop a theory of asymmetries between voluntary and mandatory disclosure. Efficiently designed mandatory disclosure policies are substitutes for excessive voluntary disclosures. The efficient policy takes the form of a lower threshold below which firms must disclose bad news and an upper threshold above which firms voluntarily disclose good news. Hence mandatory disclosures are asymmetric and feature conservative reporting of bad news. The threshold to recognize bad news increases when information is more precise. We also characterize interactions between disclosures and real decisions in environments where information has social value: investment decisions, optimal liquidations, and adverse selection in a lemons market.