Manager perception and proprietary investment disclosure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rawson, Caleb
• 署名单位: University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1380-6653
• DOI: 10.1007/s11142-021-09629-1
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1493-1525
• 关键词: trade secrets law; ceo overconfidence; CORPORATE DISCLOSURE; INFORMATION; TRANSPARENCY; COSTS

摘要

This paper investigates the role of manager perception in proprietary disclosure decisions. I find robust evidence that firms with overconfident CEOs (managers who are more likely to perceive proprietary costs to be lower) provide significantly more narrative R&D disclosures than firms without overconfident CEOs. In cross-sectional analysis, I find that this result is driven by observations where proprietary costs are more significant and salient. Consistent with R&D disclosures being proprietary, I find that the return on R&D is significantly lower when firms have more R&D disclosure and that this relation is not impacted by the presence of an overconfident CEO except through higher R&D disclosure. Finally, I find no association between having an overconfident CEO and nonproprietary disclosure. Collectively, these results suggest that manager perception of proprietary costs is an important determinant of firms' voluntary proprietary disclosure.