Investigating discretion in executive contracting: extracting private information from valuation allowance decisions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Drake, Katharine D.; Engel, Ellen; Martin, Melissa A.
• 署名单位: University of Arizona
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1380-6653
• DOI: 10.1007/s11142-021-09648-y
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 533-569
• 关键词: deferred tax assets; performance-measures; ceo compensation; earnings; SUBJECTIVITY; determinants; turnover; CHOICE; FIRMS; POWER

摘要

We investigate how boards incorporate private information about managerial performance in compensation and turnover decisions. Building from the literature documenting that loss firms' publicly available valuation allowance (VA) disclosures contain value-relevant private information, we show that the decision of whether to record a VA also captures contract-relevant private information. We develop an approach to extract a private, firm-specific, time-varying signal of managerial performance by inferring a more positive (negative) private signal when the VA decision suggests the firm expects the loss to be transitory (persistent). Our empirical analyses rely on a joint test of whether the VA decision reflects a private signal of managerial performance and whether the board uses this private information in contracting. Confirming our hypothesis, we document significantly larger discretionary compensation for transitory loss-firm CEOs, relative to persistent loss-firms. We also show that the VA decision informs the weighting of earnings in determining CEO compensation. Additionally, we provide evidence that the likelihood of CEO turnover is lower in transitory loss-firm years, relative to persistent loss-firms. Overall, extracting private information from the VA decision provides an innovative way to extend understanding of how boards use discretion in contracting.