Knowing that you know: incentive effects of relative performance disclosure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Casas-Arce, Pablo; Deller, Carolyn; Martinez-Jerez, F. Asis; Narciso, Jose Manuel
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Downtown Phoenix; University of Pennsylvania; Cornell University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1380-6653
• DOI: 10.1007/s11142-021-09636-2
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 91-125
• 关键词: problem-solving deficits; feedback; COMPENSATION; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; GENDER; contests; fairness; women

摘要

This paper studies differential employee responses to the public disclosure of individual performance information throughout an organization. We argue that, to the extent that employees care about their colleagues' perceptions of their productivity, public disclosure will increase motivation. Moreover, the effect should be stronger for employees whose colleagues expect them to have higher performance. We obtained data from a bank that transitioned from private to public disclosure of employee rankings and, consistent with our hypothesis, find heterogeneity in employee responses to public disclosure. Employees with a history of poor performance increase their output more than past good performers when rankings become public. Additionally, more highly educated employees react more strongly to the change. However, contrary to the literature that finds gender differences in competitive environments, we do not find systematic differences in the response to public disclosure on this dimension. Overall, the results suggest that public disclosure is an important dimension to consider when designing a compensation system.