Analyst coverage and syndicated lending

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hallman, Nicholas; Howe, John S.; Wang, Wei
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1380-6653
• DOI: 10.1007/s11142-022-09670-8
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 1531-1569
• 关键词: Information asymmetry; private information; loan; side; liquidity; forecasts; demand; cost

摘要

We study the effects of analyst coverage on syndicated lending. We hypothesize that analyst research alleviates information asymmetries between lead arrangers and participant lenders within a syndicate, increasing the participants' credit supply and reducing the required loan interest spread. Using exogenous shocks to firms' analyst coverage, we find that firms pay higher loan interest spreads and that participant lenders fund smaller fractions of the loans after firms experience a reduction in analyst coverage. Participants are more likely to be nonbank institutional investors and to transact with familiar lead arrangers after the coverage shocks.