The nail that sticks out: corporate social responsibility and shareholder proposals

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barnett, Michael L.; Dimitrov, Valentin; Gao, Feng
• 署名单位: Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Rutgers University Newark; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1380-6653
• DOI: 10.1007/s11142-022-09739-4
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1575-1618
• 关键词: institutional investors; financial performance; Activism; governance; sustainability; IMPACT; CSR

摘要

We investigate whether shareholders consider firms' performance in corporate social responsibility (CSR) when submitting proxy proposals. We find that share-holders are more likely to propose governance changes when a firm has more CSR strengths and more CSR concerns. The results hold across popular proposal types, different sponsors, and different categories of CSR. We find similar results for social proposals. Although CSR strengths and concerns are not associated with the percentage of votes received in favor of a proposal, the higher likelihood of receiving shareholder proposals translates into a higher likelihood that at least one shareholder proposal receives majority support at the meeting. Our results suggest managers may avoid distinctively strong (and weak) CSR performance to reduce the costs of standing out.