Corrupt tax bureau commissioners and corporate tax avoidance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chu, Jian; Shan, Yaowen; Tian, Gary Gang
• 署名单位: Nanjing University; University of Technology Sydney; Macquarie University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1380-6653
• DOI: 10.1007/s11142-024-09862-4
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1873-1915
• 关键词: political connections; grabbing hand; FIRMS; ENFORCEMENT; GOVERNMENT; irs; institutions; incentives; BRIBERY; debt

摘要

This study documents that Chinese non-state-owned enterprises have effective tax rates that are 1% lower during the tenure of corrupt regional tax bureau commissioners (i.e., regional tax bureau chiefs). The reduction in the effective tax rate persists even after controlling for political connections of firms, general local corruption, and a variety of other determinants of tax avoidance. Further analysis shows that corrupt tax commissioners induce bribery activities and exacerbate tax avoidance, and firms in a region overseen by a corrupt tax commissioner are more likely to engage in tax haven operations and tax evasion activities as tax aggressive strategies. However, the influence of corrupt tax commissioners is moderated by a stronger regional legal system and a better information environment. Overall, our results highlight the significant impact of individual tax administrators on corporate tax avoidance behavior.