Auditor reputation building
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Mayhew, BW
署名单位：
University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0021-8456
DOI：
10.1111/1475-679X.00030
发表日期：
2001
页码：
599-617
关键词：
摘要：
This paper reports the results of air experimental economics study designed to examine reputation building by information verifiers (auditors). The results identify boundary conditions to reputation formation and supply insight into auditors' incentives to form reputations. Reputations form in all sessions of treatments that supply nearly immediate rewards to participants who adopt reputation equilibrium strategies. In contrast, reputations form in less than half of the sessions of a treatment where participants have to maintain reputation equilibrium strategies for number of periods before the market rewards their effort. The results suggest the immediacy of rewards for adopting reputation strategies is a critical determinant of reputation formation.
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