Competitive pricing in markets with different overhead costs: Concealment or leakage of cost information?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cardinaels, Eddy; Roodhooft, Filip; Warlop, Luk; Van Herck, Gustaaf
• 署名单位: Tilburg University; KU Leuven; Vlerick Business School; KU Leuven
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00292.x
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 761-784
• 关键词: Collusion; cournot; EFFICIENCY; disclosure; QUALITY

摘要

This paper experimentally investigates how leaders and followers in a duopoly set prices for two product markets that have different overhead costs. In a fully crossed two-by two design, we manipulate the participants' private cost report quality as either low or high, representing the extent to which these reports reveal that product markets have different overhead costs. We show that when only the leader is given a high-quality cost report, private cost information of higher quality is better incorporated into market prices (that are observable to participants). Both the leader and follower improve in profits and their prices better reflect the differences in overhead costs because the follower infers information from the leader's prices (information leakage). In contrast, when only the follower receives a high-quality cost report, the leader's profits and prices do not improve. This occurs because the follower conceals cost information when the leader has a low-quality cost report.