Incentive Contracting and Value Relevance of Earnings and Cash Flows

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Banker, Rajiv D.; Huang, Rong; Natarajan, Ramachandran
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; City University of New York (CUNY) System; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2009.00335.x
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 647-678
• 关键词: relative performance evaluation; ACCOUNTING EARNINGS; executive-compensation; corporate governance; ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE; ceo compensation; INFORMATION; association; STEWARDSHIP; OPERATIONS

摘要

Accounting performance measures such as earnings and cash flows are useful for both valuation and performance evaluation purposes. However, little evidence exists on whether there is any association between these two roles. In this study, we provide large sample empirical evidence that the value relevance of earnings explains a significant amount of the cross-sectional variation in the pay-sensitivity of earnings and the incremental value relevance of cash flows explains variation in the marginal pay-sensitivity of cash flows. We document that while both value relevance and compensation weight on earnings decline from the subperiod of 1993 to 1997 to the subperiod of 1998 to 2003, both value relevance and compensation weight on cash flows increase from the earlier subperiod to the later subperiod. Overall, our results provide additional evidence that value relevance of a performance measure plays a significant role in its use for performance evaluation.