Voluntary Disclosures and Analyst Feedback

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Langberg, Nisan; Sivaramakrishnan, K.
• 署名单位: University of Houston System; University of Houston
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2009.00360.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 603-646
• 关键词: EARNINGS FORECASTS; decisions; FIRMS

摘要

We study the resource allocation role of voluntary disclosures when feedback from financial markets is potentially useful to managers in undertaking value maximizing actions. Managers weigh the short-term price implications of disclosure against the long-term efficiency gains due to feedback while financial analysts strategically produce information. The model can explain why managers disclose bad information (e.g., grim outlook), that reduces the stock price, and why prices respond more strongly to bad news relative to good news. We find that not all firms enjoy the same quality of feedback, and that feedback, by itself, does not induce more disclosure but less.