Elections and Discretionary Accruals: Evidence from 2004
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Ramanna, Karthik; Roychowdhury, Sugata
署名单位：
Harvard University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0021-8456
DOI：
10.1111/j.1475-679X.2010.00373.x
发表日期：
2010
页码：
445-475
关键词：
摘要：
We examine the accrual choices of outsourcing firms with links to U.S. congressional candidates during the 2004 elections, when corporate outsourcing was a major campaign issue. We find that politically connected firms with more extensive outsourcing activities have more income-decreasing discretionary accruals. Further, relative to adjacent periods, the evidence is concentrated in the two calendar quarters immediately preceding the 2004 election, consistent with heightened incentives for firms to manage earnings during the election season. The incentives can be attributed to donor firms' concerns about the potentially negative consequences of scrutiny over outsourcing for themselves and for their affiliated candidates.
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