Voluntary Disclosure, Manipulation, and Real Effects

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Beyer, Anne; Guttman, Ilan
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2012.00459.x
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 1141-1177
• 关键词: information; determinants; INVESTMENT; QUALITY; cournot; prices; MARKET; POLICY; FIRMS; MODEL

摘要

We study a model in which managers disclosure and investment decisions are both endogenous and managers can manipulate their voluntary reports through (suboptimal) investment, financing, or operating decisions. Managers are privately informed about the value of their firm and have incentives to voluntarily disclose information and manipulate their reports in order to obtain more favorable terms when issuing equity to finance a new profitable investment opportunity. The model shows that treating managers disclosure and investment decisions both as endogenous and allowing managers to manipulate their voluntary reports yields qualitatively different predictions from when the disclosure and investment decisions are considered separately and managers cannot engage in manipulation. The model predicts that managers disclosure strategy is sometimes characterized by two distinct nondisclosure intervals (contrary to traditional threshold equilibria of voluntary disclosure models) and that managers with intermediate news sometimes forego the new profitable investment opportunity. As such, the paper highlights the importance of considering the interdependencies between firms disclosure and investment decisions and provides new empirical predictions.